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The Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade held that the abortion right is a fundament of
the constitutional right to personal privacy.3 The Roe Court’s privacy analysis has
been criticized by constitutional scholars from the right and left as lacking a textual
basis in the Constitution.4 Some scholars have attempted to re-conceive the abortion
right on equal protection terms, but the requirement of purposeful discrimination5 has
hobbled such efforts.6 Despite the difficulties of grounding the abortion right in the
Due Process Clause or the Equal Protection Clause, this right does have a basis in the
text of the Constitution or the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment,7 a passage that was so recently revived or at least remembered in Saenz
v. Roe.8 The Privileges or Immunities Clause, unlike the modern Equal Protection
Clause, does not require a demonstration of purposeful discrimination9 and so this
3

Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973).

4

See, e.g., John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82
YALE L.J. 920 (1973); Richard A. Epstein, Substantive Due Process By Any Other Name: The
Abortion Cases, 1973 Sup. Ct. Rev. 159; Laurence Tribe, Foreword: Toward a Model of the
Roles in the Due Process of Life and Law, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1, 7 (1973).
5

See, e.g., Personnel Administrator v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979).

6

See, e.g., Reva Siegel, Reasoning From the Body: A Historical Perspective On Abortion
Regulation And Questions Of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261 (1992); Catharine A.
MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, 100 YALE L.J. 1281 (1991).
7

U.S. CONST. Amend. XIV, § 1 in part that: “No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.”
8

119 S. Ct. 1518 (1999).

9

See supra note 7.
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obstacle cannot hamper the argument presented herein as it did the equal protection
arguments.
In this article, the Privileges or Immunities Clause will be re-conceived in its
original context, at the center of the Fourteenth Amendment.10 This re-conception
includes the assumption that The Slaughter-House Cases11 were decided
incorrectly.12 The contention of the article is that abortion restrictions, as a specific
originalist matter, can be considered economic legislation and that they also
economically burden women,13 such that they unconstitutionally abridge two
privileges or immunities, the Lochnerian liberties to contract and the engagement in
any of the common occupations. Specifically, abortion restrictions violate “the
prohibition on redistributive ‘class’ legislation . . . that was deeply rooted in the
original understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment.”14 This claim is confined to a
reconciliation of the original understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment with the
Casey Court’s holding that “a State may not prohibit any woman from making the
ultimate decision to terminate her pregnancy before viability.”15
I. A BRIEF DIAGRAM OF THE MECHANISM
To arrive at a modern, yet specific originalist understanding of the liberty to
contract and the liberty to engage in any of the common occupations, their existence,
scope, importance and applicability to women must be first identified through an
examination of the Lochner-era Supreme Court jurisprudence. The modern
component of the originalist understanding of privileges or immunities is added by
examining a specific originalist conception of Section Five of the Fourteenth
Amendment, which grants Congress the power to interpret civil rights established
prior to the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment by enacting “appropriate
legislation.”16 As will be contended, Congress’ interpretive power under Section
Five is a specific originalist mechanism allowing Congress to recognize and to
respond to changed social contexts, including economic realities for women and
social attitudes on women. Two such responses are the Family Medical Leave Act17
and the Pregnancy Discrimination Act.18 These two statutes will be examined for
10

See Jeffrey Rosen, Translating the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 66 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1241, 1241 (1998) (asserting that the Privileges or Immunities Clause is the clause from
which the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment expected most).
11

83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).

12
See Rosen, supra note 10, at 1241 (arguing that “‘everyone,’ we’re told, now agrees that
the Supreme Court took a wrong turn in the Slaughter-House cases in 1873, when a narrow
majority read the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment out of the
Constitution by construing it into irrelevancy”).
13

See Siegel, supra note 6; see also MacKinnon, supra note 6.

14

See Rosen, supra note 10, at 1248.

15
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 879 (1992). Thus, this article need not
entertain, e.g., fetal rights.
16

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.

17

29 U.S.C. § 2601 (1998).

18

Pub. L. 95-555 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1998)).
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Congress’ understanding and treatment of women’s reproductive role in economic
terms and how this understanding and treatment affects the constitutionality of
abortion restrictions.
The suggested “resurrection” of the Lochnerian civil rights will be seen not to
vitiate the New Deal, because the “resurrection” does not require an exclusive
economic premise of classical economics to the exclusion of the progressive
economics of the New Deal. Rather the argument can be seen as relying on the
premise of the Fourteenth Amendment in its original context, a securing of “limited
absolute equality,”19 as interpreted by Congress pursuant to Section Five. In
addition, the New Deal will be seen as only reducing the importance of Lochnerian
rights, but not nullifying them, and in the process can be seen as consistent with an
originalist view of the Fourteenth Amendment.
A. An Originalist Interpretation of Per Se Abortion Rights
For a textualist or an originalist, a right to be free from abortion restrictions is
unlikely to be a privilege or immunity of federal citizenship. Professor McConnell
identifies two sources of privileges or immunities for a textualist or specific
originalist20—the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, as nonexhaustively interpreted by Corfield v. Coryell and the rights enumerated in the Civil
Rights Act of 1866,—and abortion rights are not once mentioned.21
A non-specific originalist interpretation requires the same conclusion.
Historically, abortion was legally permissible at common law at the opening of the
nineteenth century if performed before quickening.22 Through the middle of the
century and especially in the years following the Civil War, states enacted legislation
restricting abortion, and the cumulative effect was to prohibit abortion from
conception.23 Thus, under McConnell’s useful three-pronged test for whether a
given right is a privilege or immunity of citizenship,24 a right to be free from abortion
restrictions fails, as state legislatures abolished the common law right to abortion
before quickening. Therefore, the assumption that a per se right to be free from
abortion restrictions is not a privilege or immunity of citizenship is sound.
B. The Myth That Life Begins At Conception
Any originalist argument, if not any legal argument, against abortion restrictions
requires a consideration of the history of abortion law to determine whether, as a
19

See Rosen, supra note 10, at 1242; Earl Maltz, Reconstruction Without Revolution:
Republican Civil Rights Theory in the Era of the Fourteenth Amendment, 24 HOUS. L. REV.
221, 224 (1987).
20

See Michael McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV.
947, 1027-28 (1995).
21

See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2; Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F.Cas. 546, 551 (C.C.D.Pa. 1823)
(No. 3230); the Civil Rights Act of 1866, Ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27.
22

See Siegel, supra note 6, at 281-82 (1992).

23

Id. at 282.

24

See McConnell, supra note 20, at 1028 (stating that these prongs are: nationally uniform,
permanent and stable part of American legal legacy, and legally enforceable as a matter of
right rather than discretionary).
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constitutional principal, life begins at conception. The text of the Constitution and
the Supreme Court prior to Roe are silent on the matter. Thus, an examination of the
common law and American practice in the nineteenth century, an era when abortion
law was in flux is warranted.25 Within the nineteenth century, there were two general
phases of abortion law, and neither establishes that, as a constitutional principal, life
begins at conception. At most, the evidence as to when life begins is unclear. This
history as well as the text of the Fourteenth Amendment bar fetuses from possessing
constitutional rights.
1. Phase One: The Common Law at the Opening of the Nineteenth Century
Abortion was legally permissible at common law at the opening of the nineteenth
century if performed before quickening, typically in the fourth or fifth month of
pregnancy.26 Quickening was the first perception of fetal movement by the pregnant
woman.27 As Mohr noted, the common law did not recognize the existence of a fetus
until it had quickened, but after it had quickened, the destruction of a fetus was
“considered a crime, because the fetus itself had manifested some semblance of a
separate existence: the ability to move.”28 In addition, the crime of destroying a fetus
“was qualitatively different from the destruction of a human being . . . and punished
less harshly.”29
The Massachusetts Supreme Court, establishing the common law in the United
States in Commonwealth v. Bangs, held that abortions early in pregnancy were
beyond the scope of the law, and not a crime.30 Bangs was the seminal case on
quickening during this first general phase, and various state courts followed it.31
2. The Second General Phase: The Movement to Restrict Abortions
During the middle of the nineteenth century and especially in the years following
the Civil War, states began to enact various legislative restrictions on abortion so as
to prohibit abortion from conception.32 Between 1860 and 1880, states and
territories passed forty anti-abortion statutes in different forms and for various
reasons,33 and these statutes generally abolished the common law doctrine of
quickening.34

25

See JAMES MOHR, ABORTION IN AMERICA (1978).

26

Siegel, supra note 6, at 281-82.

27

MOHR, supra note 25, at 3.

28

MOHR, supra note 25, at 3.

29

MOHR, supra note 25, at 3.

30

9 Mass. 387 (1812).

31
See Commonwealth v. Parker, 50 Mass. 263 (1845); State v. Smith, 32 Me. Rep. 369
(1851); Abrams v. Foshee, 3 Cole’s Ed. 274 (Iowa 1856); Smith v. Gaffard, 31 Ala. 45 (1857);
and Mitchell v. Commonwealth, 78 Ky. 204 (1879).
32

Siegel, supra note 6, at 282.

33

See MOHR, supra note 25, at 200-25.

34

See Siegel, supra note 6, at 282.
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In the national political movement to ban abortion, many reasons were cited to
justify an abandonment of the old common law doctrine of quickening. The political
movement and subsequent transformation in abortion law “occurred at the behest of
the nation’s physicians.”35 Doctors’ opposition to abortion was “partly ideological,
partly scientific, partly moral, and partly practical.”36 Scientifically and morally, the
doctors argued that human development was “continuous from the point of
conception,” and that abortion at any stage of pregnancy was therefore an unjustified
destruction of human life.37 Practically, the doctors were attempting to establish the
medical profession as a profession, and, by opposing abortion, they sought to
distinguish themselves from popular practitioners “in method and commitment” by
opposing abortion.38
The Ohio legislative record is representative of this national campaign against
abortion and provides much evidence of the doctors’ role in lobbying state legislators
for criminal abortion statutes.39 A special legislative committee submitted a proposal
for banning abortion in Ohio along with a formal report on abortion in Ohio, which
“clearly demonstrated the influence of the national physicians’ crusade at the state
level.”40 The special committee attributed its understanding of abortion to the
American Medical Association and acknowledged that its report recited many of the
facts that were listed in the anti-abortion tract of Horatio Storer, a prominent leader
in the anti-abortion movement and former Harvard professor of obstetrics and
gynecology.41
The committee’s report mentioned that abortions frequently occurred, and that
middle class women aborted most often.42 The report also contended that abortion
was murder, and a danger to women because abortion violated “nature’s laws.”43
The report condemned women who resisted motherhood, and warned married
women who were avoiding their marital obligations.44 The report’s conclusion
indicated that the Ohio legislators were concerned about the demographic failure of
the American family.45

35

Id.

36

MOHR, supra note 25, at 34-35.

37

Siegel, supra note 6, at 282.

38

Siegel, supra note 6, at 283.

39

Siegel, supra note 6, at 315.

40

MOHR, supra note 25, at 206-07 (citing 1867 Ohio Senate J. App., 233-35).

41

Siegel, supra note 6, at 316 (citing Ohio Senate J. App., at 233, 235; HORATIO ROBINSON
STORER, WHY NOT? A BOOK FOR EVERY WOMAN (1866)).
42

See MOHR, supra note 25, at 207.

43

Siegel, supra note 6, at 316 (citing 1867 Ohio Senate J. App. 234).

44

Siegel, supra note 6, at 316-17 (citing 1867 Ohio Senate J. App. 235).

45

MOHR, supra note 25, at 208.
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Subsequently, the Ohio legislature criminalized the destruction of the fetus, and
nullified the common law of quickening.46 The criminal statute, however, did not
punish abortion as murder, and instead classified abortion at any stage of gestation as
a “high misdemeanor.”47 Thus, as Professor Siegel argued, the Ohio criminal
abortion statute “was enacted out of a confluence of concerns, reflecting an interest
in enforcing women’s adherence to marital roles, in preserving the hegemony of [the
middle class,] and in protecting unborn life.”48 To add to this confluence, the Ohio
law was also pro-physician special interest legislation, enacted against the wishes of
the people of Ohio.49
Not only did this confluence of reasons motivate the Ohio legislature aside from
protecting the unborn, but not even in the legislature’s desire to protect the unborn
did it premise that life begins at conception. Protecting unborn life is not
synonymous with the proposition that life begins at conception, as reflected in the
Ohio legislature’s failure to classify abortion as murder. Similarly, the North
Carolina Supreme Court in State v. Slagle held that “it is not the murder of a living
child that constitutes the offense, but the destruction of gestation by wicked means
and against nature,”50 a result that was affirmed by the North Carolina legislature in
1881.51 Thus, states may have nullified the common law doctrine of quickening as a
legal mechanism to permit abortions, but the nullification was not so extensive so as
to establish that life begins at conception.
In addition, the flux in abortion law itself bars establishment of a principal or
tenet of American social context that life begins at conception. Abortion restrictions
were not hoary laws with hoary premises and underpinnings; they were the product
of a national political movement without precedent in the history of abortion law. If
McConnell’s three-prong test is adapted to determine if a principal of social context
can affect a constitutional interpretation of a privilege or immunity, the post-Civil
War movement fails to justify a constitutional principal that life begins at
conception.52 Abortion restrictions and their underlying premises were not uniform,
were varied from state to state, were not a permanent and stable part of the American
legal legacy, and were necessarily subject to the vicissitudes of legislative policy.
II. THERE ARE NO CONSTITUTIONAL FETAL RIGHTS
Textually, the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
protects only citizens of the United States.53 To be a citizen of the United States,
persons must be “born or naturalized in the United States,” a requirement that a fetus
46

Siegel, supra note 6, at 315 n. 223 (citing Act of Apr. 13, 1867, Ohio Laws 135-136,
repealed by Amended Substitute House Bill No. 511, 1972 Ohio Laws 2032 (Vol. 134)).
47

Siegel, supra note 6, at 317 (citing Act of Apr. 13, 1867, Ohio Laws 135-136).

48

Id.

49

See 1867 OHIO SENATE J. APP. 233-35 (acknowledging that public opinion tolerated
abortion and the common law doctrine of quickening and deriding quackery).
50

82 N.C. 653 (1880).

51

MOHR, supra note 25, at 227 (citing North Carolina Session Laws 1881).

52

See McConnell, supra note 20, at 1028.

53

See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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cannot satisfy.54 The Equal Protection Clause and Due Process Clause extend
protection to “any person.”55 The Court in Roe v. Wade, after examining the
prevailing abortion practices in the nineteenth century and reviewing all references to
“person” in the Constitution, found as a textual and historical matter that “person,” as
used in the Fourteenth Amendment, does not include the unborn.56 Therefore, and
consistent with the common law doctrine of quickening and the intent and purposes
of abortion restrictions as discussed above, fetuses are not entitled to constitutional
protection.
As a result, an examination of whether abortion restrictions violate the Privileges
or Immunities Clause need not examine the principal that life begins at conception,
as, at minimum, it was never established, and, more likely, was never truly accepted.
Indeed, one could plausibly argue that abortion restrictions, in redistributing money
to the American Medical Association and away from “quacks,” were
unconstitutional class legislation in the nineteenth century. Moreover, a woman’s
liberty to contract and liberty to engage in the common occupations do not compete
with a fetus’s rights, as the latter are non-existent.
III. THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT57 ENCOMPASSES WOMEN
Textually, Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment does not distinguish
between men and women, instead referring to a “person,” “persons,” and
“citizens.”58 This textual understanding forecloses a contrary specific originalist
understanding that limits the Amendment’s applicability to men.59
A. Originalism and the Theoretical Liberty to Contract
The Civil Rights Act of 1866 “encompassed the principal civil rights directly
contemplated by the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment.”60 Among these civil

54

Id.

55

Id.

56

Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 157 (1973).

57

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 provides that
[a]ll persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.
58

See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. See also Akhil Reed Amar, Women and the
Constitution, 18 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 465, 467 (1995) (arguing that the Fourteenth
Amendment was textually designed to give all persons certain civil rights, but not political
rights).
59

But see Amar, supra note 58, at 469 (arguing contrary to Farnsworth’s view that women
are in some ways at the center of Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment).
60

McConnell, supra note 20, at 1027.
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rights designated by the 1866 Act was the liberty to contract61. . . . While the
existence of the liberty to contract is not disputed,62 the actual scope of the liberty is
a matter of debate, and thus an examination of the Supreme Court’s interpretation of
the liberty to contract is necessary.
In Barbier v. Connolly,63 the Supreme Court broadly interpreted the original
intent of the liberty to contract and in so doing displayed hostility to class
legislation.64 The Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment “undoubtedly
intended” that “no impediment should be interposed to the pursuits of any one,
except as applied to the same pursuits by others under like circumstances; that no
greater burdens should be laid upon one than are laid upon others in the same calling
and condition.”65 The Barbier Court also recognized that the liberty to contract is
not unlimited, because the Fourteenth Amendment was not designed to interfere with
the power of the state “to prescribe regulations to promote the health, peace, morals,
education and good order of the people.”66
Holden v. Hardy67 was the Court’s first examination of the liberty to contract
with respect to labor legislation. The Holden Court assessed for its constitutionality
a Utah statutory provision that placed a ceiling on the number of hours men may
work each day in underground mines.68 The Court sustained the statutory provision,
holding that it did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment on the basis that the Utah
legislature reasonably found the occupation of mining to be “detrimental to the
health of the employees.”69 The Court carefully distinguished the Utah statute from
a general maximum hours statute, observing that the statute “does not profess to limit
the hours of all workmen, but merely those who are employed in underground mines,
or in the smelting, reduction, or refining of ores or metals.”70 Thus, the Holden
61
The Civil Rights Act of 1866, § 1 provides in pertinent part that “[a]ll persons within the
jurisdiction of United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and
enforce contracts . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens.
62

See Howard Gillman, The Constitution Besieged; Roscoe Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18
YALE L.J. 454 (1909).
63

113 U.S. 27 (1884).

64

See Gillman, supra note 62, at 201 (arguing that long-standing features of nineteenth
century police powers jurisprudence are “an emphasis on market liberty, the belief that market
liberty could be interfered with if legislation promoted a valid public purpose, and the
suggestion that valid public-purpose legislation was distinct from laws that merely promoted
the interests of some classes at the expense of others”).
65

113 U.S. at 31.

66

Id. See also Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 137 (1894) (holding that for the State
justifiably to interpose its authority, “it must appear--First that the interests of the public
generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require such interference; and,
second, that the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and
not unduly oppressive upon individuals”).
67

Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366 (1898).

68

Id. at 380.

69

Id. at 395.

70

Id.
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Court’s justificatory basis for the Utah statute or, more broadly, the scope of a state’s
proper exercise of its police powers, is predicated on the dangerousness of a given
occupation.71 The Court additionally evinced a scepticism as to the constitutionality
of a general maximum hours statute, where such dangerousness is unlikely to be
reasonably found, a scepticism that was later confirmed in Lochner v. New York.72
The Court acknowledged the Utah legislature’s finding that the owners of mines
and their employees “do not stand upon an equality, and that their interests are, to a
certain extent, conflicting.”73 Nevertheless the Court held that a disparity of
bargaining power does not by itself justify a state’s interference with market
relations, but that a disparity entailing a neglect of laborers’ health and safety, would
be sufficient justification.74 The Court’s approach in Holden indicates that a state’s
interference on behalf of exploited workers is consistent with its general police
powers.75 The Court’s position in Holden may be regarded as a restriction on an
employee’s liberty to contract, but only insofar as the employee, laboring in an
inherently hazardous occupation like mining, is “protected against himself,”76 a
setting where a state’s interest in the general welfare of its citizens is implicated and
competes with the individual’s Fourteenth Amendment civil rights.
Holden stands for the proposition that “police powers could be used not only to
promote the general well-being of the community but also the specific well-being of
a class of workers who were not in a position to make contracts favorable to their
health and safety.”77 This latter instance, an expansion of the police powers which
describes the position of the miners in Holden and which appeared to the Holden
Court as anomalous, “is now disclosed to be of far wider and deeper application” in
light of industrialization.78
IV. THE COMMON OCCUPATIONS OF LIFE
Another privilege or immunity protected by the Fourteenth Amendment is the
right to follow any of the common occupations. Justice Bradley reported that “[t]he
right to follow any of the common occupations of life is an inalienable right, it was
formulated as such under the phrase ‘pursuit of happiness’ in the declaration of
71

See Gillman, supra note 62 at 122-25.

72

198 U.S. 45 (1905) (invalidating a maximum hours law for bakers as violative of the
Fourteenth Amendment on the bases that the act abridged the liberty to contract and that the
state intervention was not authorized, because baking is not an unhealthy occupation).
73

Holden, 169 U.S. at 397.

74

See id. See also HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED 123 (clarifying this
point in light of what Gillman views as Justice Brown’s ambiguous drafting of the opinion).
75

See id. (emphasizing that “[t]he whole is no greater than the sum of all the parts, and
when the individual health, safety, and welfare are sacrificed or neglected, the state must
suffer”).
76

Id.

77

Gillman, supra note 62, at 125 (citing Fowler Vincent Harper, Due Process of Law in
State Labor Legislation, 26 MICH. L. REV. 599, 620-21 (1928)).
78

See Gillman, supra note 62, at 142 (citing Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U.S. 426, 431-33
(1917) (Felix Frankfurter et al, for defendants in error)).
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independence.”79 Justice Bradley, expressing his dissatisfaction with the Court’s
evisceration of the Privileges or Immunities Clause80 in the Slaughter-House Cases81
and approval of Corfield v. Coryell,82 again asserted that this right is “one of the
privileges of a citizen of the United States.”83 The Supreme Court later expressly
adopted Justice Bradley’s view that the right to follow any of the common
occupations is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment in Allgeyer v. Louisiana.84
The Court most famously invoked this right in Yick Wo v. Hopkins where it ruled
that the disparate administration of a municipal licensing ordinance violated the
Equal Protection Clause on the basis that “[n]o reason whatever, except the will of
the supervisors, is assigned why [200 Chinese] should not be permitted to carry on,
in the accustomed manner, their harmless and useful occupation, on which they
depend for a livelihood.”85 Similarly, the Court in Truax v. Raich held that an
Arizona statute requiring eighty percent of every employer’s laborers to be qualified
electors or native-born citizens violated the right to follow any of the common
occupations of life and constituted a denial of equal protection, because “[n]o special
public interest with respect to any particular business is shown that could possibly be
deemed to support the enactment.”86 As a proof construct, Truax alluded to a
disparate impact standard, inasmuch as “[t]he purpose of an act must be found its
natural operation and effect.”87

79

Butchers’ Union Slaughter-House & Live-Stock Landing Co. v. Crescent City LiveStock Landing & Slaughter-House Co., 111 U.S. 746, 762 (1884) (Bradley, J., concurring).
See id. (where Justice Bradley described this right as “a large ingredient in the civil liberty of
the citizen”).
80

See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.

81

83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).

82

6 F.Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230).

83

Butchers’ Union, 111 U.S. at 764 (Bradley, J., concurring).

84

165 U.S. 578, 589-90 (1897). See also Adams v. Tanner, 244 U.S. 590, 595 (1917).

85

118 U.S. 356, 374 (1886). The Yick Wo Court’s use of “will of the supervisors” must
not be confused with the modern intentional discrimination standard, but rather as a
proscription against “the play and action of purely personal and arbitrary power.” See id. at
370. See also Richard Kay, The Equal Protection Clause in the Supreme Court, 1873-1903,
29 BUFF. L. REV. 667, 695-96 (1980) (arguing that the Yick Wo Court’s standard was “not the
presence of race but the absence of justification”).
86
239 U.S. 33, 43 (1915). In justifying its invocation of the right to follow the common
occupations, the Truax Court cited, inter alia, Justice Bradley’s concurrence in Butchers’
Union, Allgeyer, and Yick Wo. See Truax, 239 U.S. at 41. See also Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad,
271 U.S. 500, 527-28 (1926) (invalidating the Philippine legislature’s Chinese Bookkeeping
Act, which forbid the keeping of accounting records in any language other than Spanish,
English, or a local dialect, violated the right to follow any of the common occupations, as
applied to Chinese merchants of the Philippines and citing Truax).
87

239 U.S. at 40 (citing Henderson v. New York, 92 U.S. 259, 268 (1875) and Bailey v.
Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 244 (1911)).
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V. WOMEN’S LIBERTY TO CONTRACT
The Supreme Court has acknowledged that women’s liberty to contract is
theoretically equal to that of men.88 Notwithstanding this formal equality, the
Supreme Court determined that when women’s physiological differences are
implicated, men and women are not “under like circumstances”89 such that they may
be treated differently, but not disadvantageously, while retaining the semblance of
formal equality.90
Two cases that discuss the scope of a woman’s liberty to contract are Muller v.
Oregon91 and Adkins v. Children’s Hospital.92
The Court in Muller v. Oregon93 considered whether an Oregon statute providing
that “no female (shall) be employed in any mechanical establishment, or factory, or
laundry in this state more than ten hours during any one day”94 violated the
Fourteenth Amendment.95 Despite women’s formal equality in the liberty to
contract,96 the Court reviewed the statute, which facially abridged the liberty to
contract, by examining the liberty to contract and, hence, the state’s interest largely
in physiological terms.97 The Muller Court brandished a sympathy for the
“widespread belief that woman’s physical structure, and the functions she performs
in consequence thereof, justify special legislation restricting or qualifying the
conditions under which she should be permitted to toil.”98 Consistent with this
belief, the Court emphasized the disadvantageousness of women’s “physical
structure and the performance of maternal functions in . . . the struggle for
subsistence,” especially when fulfilling the maternal role.99 The Court also
acknowledged that women were deprived of educational and economic
opportunities100 such that an economic disparity existed between men and women.101
From these physiological-sociological pronouncements,102 the Court concluded that
88
See Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 418 (1908) (holding that with respect to the liberty
to contract, women “stand on the same plane as the other sex”); Adkins v. Children’s Hospital,
261 U.S. 525, 553 (1923) (holding that “it cannot except the doctrine that women of mature
age, sui juris, require or may be subjected to restrictions upon their liberty to contract which
could not be lawfully imposed in the case of men under similar circumstances”).
89

See Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 31 (1884).

90

208 U.S. at 421-22.

91

Id. at 412.

92

261 U.S. 525 (1923).

93

208 U.S. 412 (1908).

94

Id. at 416 (parentheses in original).

95

Id. at 417.

96

Id. at 418.

97

See Siegel, supra note 6, at 266 (noting that the Muller Court used physiological
reasoning to justify the protective maximum hours law).
98

Muller, 208 U.S. at 420-21.

99

Id. at 421.

100

Id. at 421-22.
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[t]hough limitations upon . . . contractual rights may be removed by
legislation, there is that in her disposition and habits of life which will
operate against a full assertion of those rights. She will still be where
some legislation to protect her seems necessary to secure a real equality of
right.103
The Court accordingly held that women are “properly placed” in their own class such
that “legislation designed for her may be sustained, even when like legislation is not
necessary for men, and could not be sustained.”104
The Court held that the statute did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment,
notwithstanding its restriction of women’s liberty to contract, because the statute
protected women from “the greed as well as the passion of man”105 and protected
“her physical structure and a proper discharge of her maternal functions.”106
Additionally, the Court construed the statute as in the general interest, because of the
necessity of women’s “vigorous health upon the future well-being of the race.”107
In Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, the Court addressed the question of whether a
general minimum wages law for women in the District of Columbia
unconstitutionally abridged the liberty to contract.108 The Court again emphasized
that women possess a liberty to contract theoretically equal to that of men.109 The
Court also re-affirmed its observation in Muller that women are physiologically
unequal, and that “the physical differences must be recognized in appropriate cases,
and legislation fixing hours or conditions of work may properly take them into
account.”110 Nevertheless, the Adkins Court ruled that the minimum wages law did

101

Id. at 422.

102

See also id. at 421 (demonstrating a notably egregious form of misogyny in noting that
men established control over women “at the outset” through “superior physical strength” such
that “woman has always been dependent upon man,” a misogyny that is not central to the
Court’s legal analysis, despite animating the opinion). As will be discussed infra, this brand
of paternalism or misogyny loses constitutional significance after the ratification of the
Nineteenth Amendment.
103

Muller, 208 U.S. at 422.

104

Id. at 422. Thus for the Oregon hours law, women and men are not “under like
circumstances.” See Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 31 (1884).
105

Muller, 208 U.S. at 422.

106

Id. at 422.

107

Id. at 422.

108

Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, 261 U.S. 525, 545 (1923) (addressing the question under
the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause as Congress enacted the District of Columbia
statute).
109

Id. at 553.

110

Id. The Court also stated without explanation that non-physical inequality between
women and men has “continued with diminishing intensity” after the ratification of the
Nineteenth Amendment. Id. Aside from the issue of political rights, the Court’s statement is
unclear in light of continued economic inequality between women and men.
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not implicate and could not rely upon women’s physiological differences.111 The
Adkins Court invalidated the minimum wages law, on the ground that it was
unlawful class legislation, i.e., it was “simply and exclusively a price-fixing law,
confined to adult women” who retain the same legal right to contract as men.112
VI. THE “GRAVITATIONAL FORCE” OF THE NINETEENTH AMENDMENT113
The ratification on the Nineteenth Amendment modified the understanding of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Lawrence Lessig argues that “often the effect of an
amendment is indirect, felt beyond the text it modifies, imposing, in Dworkin’s
sense, a ‘gravitational force’ on other parts of the text read.”114 Along these lines,
Akhil Amar argues that the Nineteenth Amendment indirectly affects a reading of
the Fourteenth Amendment inasmuch as the Nineteenth Amendment “can be
understood as establishing a kind of a fortiori argument: if women have equal
political rights, a fortiori they should have equal civil rights.”115
Professor Amar’s view is the same as that of the Adkins Court.116 Adkins held
“the ancient inequality of the sexes, otherwise than physical, as suggested in the
Muller Case . . . has continued ‘with diminished intensity.’”117 The Court added that
“[i]n view of the great—not to say revolutionary—changes which have
taken place . . . in the contractual, political, and civil status of women,
culminating in the Nineteenth Amendment, it is not unreasonable to say
that these difference have now come almost, if not quite, to the vanishing
point.”
The Fourteenth Amendment, as indirectly modified by the Nineteenth
Amendment, then proscribes from judicial or legislative consideration differences in
the social expectations of women, but must recognize in accordance with Muller
111
See id. at 550 (holding that the state does not invariably maintain an interest in its
population’s strength and robustness so as to vindicate any law on the basis of being a health
law, because noting that “[s]carcely any law but might find shelter under such assumptions,
and conduct, properly so called, as well as contract, would come under the restrictive sway of
the Legislature).
112

Adkins, 261 U.S. at 554.

113

U.S. CONST. amend. XIX provides that “[t]he right of citizens of the United States to
vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex.”
114

See Lawrence Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings: Fidelity and Theory, 47
STAN. L. REV. 395, 407 (1995) (citing RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 111
(1978)).
115

See Amar, supra note 58, at 471. Cf. Akhil Amar, The Case of the Missing
Amendments: R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul 106 HARV. L. REV. 124 (1992) (criticizing the R.A.V.
Court’s opinions for failing to consider the effect of the Fourteenth Amendment on the First
Amendment in examining a municipal hate speech ordinance); Jeffrey Rosen, Translating the
Privileges and Immunities Clause, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1241, 1248 (1998) (arguing that the
Sixteenth Amendment provides a textual basis for discarding anti-redistributivism as a
constitutional principle).
116

See Adkins, 261 U.S. at 553; Amar, supra note 58, at 471.

117

Adkins, 261 U.S. at 553.
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“physical differences . . . in appropriate cases.”118 An example of a judicial opinion
that is rendered nugatory by Adkins is Justice Bradley’s statement in Bradwell v.
Illinois119 that “[m]an is, or should be, woman’s protector and defender. The natural
and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it
for many of the occupations of civil life.”120 Such social considerations are
impermissible after the ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment.
VII. THE SOCIAL CONTEXT UNDERLYING MULLER121
In examining women’s physiology, the Lochner-era Court determined that
women and men are not “under like circumstances.”122 The primary physiological
difference is women’s performance of maternal functions.123 The Court recognized
that the performance of maternal functions places women “at a disadvantage in the
struggle for subsistence,” particularly “when the burdens of motherhood are upon
her.”124 The Court justified protective legislation for women on the basis of these
physiological assumptions.125
A. Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment: An Interpretive Mechanism
When Congress enacts “appropriate legislation”126 pursuant to Section Five of the
Fourteenth Amendment, Congress exercises its powers under a specific originalist
understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment, not to create substantive rights or
circumvent the amendment process of Article Five, but to interpret or to fashion the
Amendment.127

118

Id.

119

83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1873).

120

Bradwell, 83 U.S. at 141 (Bradley, J. concurring). See also Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S.
412, 422 (1908) (whose social statement that “[i]t is impossible to close one’s eyes to the fact
that she still looks to her brother and depends upon him” would also appear to be rendered
nugatory by Adkins).
121
“Social context” will be defined infra, in the section on methodology. The term refers
to economic realities and social attitudes prevalent in American society and the Supreme
Court’s and Congress’ treatment and understanding of them.
122

Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 31 (1884).

123

See Muller, 208 U.S. at 421-22 (noting that other differences include “the amount of
physical strength” and “the capacity for long continued labor”).
124

Id. at 421.

125

See Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908). See also Siegel, supra note 6, at 266
(arguing that the “physiological argument” played an important role in justifying the
protective legislation upheld in Muller v. Oregon).
126

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 5.

127

See Michael McConnell, Comment, Institutions and Interpretations: A Critique of City
of Boerne v. Flores, 111 HARV. L. REV. 153, 173-74 (1997) (arguing that to conclude that
interpretation is indistinguishable from amendment is to descend into postmodern
deconstructionism).
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B. Congress’ Section Five Powers Are Textually Unclear
Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits states from making or
enforcing laws that “abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States.”128 Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment provides: “The Congress shall
have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of the article.”129
The nature and scope of Congress’ powers under the Enforcement Clause are
textually unclear,130 and so an examination of the original understanding becomes
necessary.
C. The Original Understanding of Congress’ Powers under Section Five: The
Framers’ Debates
In February, 1866, Representative John Bingham proposed a version of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Joint Committee on Reconstruction which provided
that Congress
“shall have power to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper to
secure to the citizens of each State all privileges and immunities of
citizens in the several States, and to all persons in the several States equal
protection in he rights of life, liberty, and property.”131
Bingham’s draft encountered immediate opposition on the basis that the draft
authorized Congress “to intrude into traditional areas of state responsibility, a power
inconsistent with federal design.”132 In April, 1866, Bingham submitted a revised
draft, providing that:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

....
The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the
provisions of the Article.133
128

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.

129

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.

130

See McConnell, supra note 127, at 170 (arguing that substantive, remedial, and
interpretive powers are the three logical interpretations of the text of Section Five that “stand
out”). But see, Saikrishna Prakash, A Comment on Congressional Enforcement, 32 IND. L.
REV. 193 (1998) (arguing that Congress’ enforcement powers are textually limited to the
authority to enact penalties for Fourteenth Amendment violations and to create federal
institutions to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment).
131

CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1034 (1866).

132

City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 521 (1997) (citing the statements of
Representatives Hale and Hotchkiss, and Senator Stewart at CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st
Sess. 1063-65, 1082, 1095 (1866)).
133
CONG. GLOBE 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2286 (1866), cited in McConnell, supra note 127, at
177 n. 148.
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This draft, after other revisions that are not pertinent here, was ratified in July, 1868
as the Fourteenth Amendment.134
In comparing the February and April drafts, the change of breaking the concept
of “equal protection in the rights of life, liberty, and property” into two clauses,135 a
prohibition of the denial of “equal protection of the laws” and a prohibition against
depriving “any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law,” was
critical “to relieving the concerns expressed by moderate Republicans about the
February proposal.”136 While Bingham insisted that the February proposal “meant
only that Congress could protect preexisting rights,”137 McConnell noted that “many
members of Congress, including Republicans, feared that it would invest Congress
with the power to pass legislation directly regarding life, liberty, and property.”138
This criticism was “directed exclusively” to the equal protection provision of the
February proposal.139 Thus, the April proposal stripped Congress of “any power it
might have under the February draft to provide direct protection of life, liberty, and
property,”140 and Congress’s power to enforce preexisting constitutional rights, such
as the liberty to contract,141 “was not affected by this change.”142 The Fourteenth
Amendment’s history indicates that Congressional power was limited to an
enforcement of rights established by the Amendment itself, which “was an important
protection for the states, because it ensured that neither Congress nor the Courts
could go beyond the rights enshrined in the Constitution itself.”143

134

See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 523.

135

McConnell, supra note 127, at 179 n. 159.

136

McConnell, supra note 127, at 179 n. 159 (citing EARL MALTZ, CIVIL RIGHTS,
CONSTITUTION, AND CONGRESS, 1863-1869 56-60, 100-01 (1990).

THE

137
McConnell, supra note 127, at 179 n. 159 (citing CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess.
157-58, 1089-90 (1866)).
138

McConnell, supra note 127, at 179 n. 159.

139
Cong. Globe 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1064 (1866) (statement of Rep. Hale), cited in
McConnell, supra note 127, at 180. See Cong. Globe 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1064 (1866)
(statement of Rep. Hale); Cong. Globe 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1095 (statement of Rep.
Hotchkiss) (1866) (Hale and Hotchkiss both expressly stated that their criticism did not apply
to the Privileges or Immunities Clause, the expected vehicle for the incorporation of the liberty
to contract).
140

McConnell, supra note 127, at 180.

141

See Gillman, supra note 62, at 27-28 (observing that the liberty to contract is rooted in
the common law and that Alexander Hamilton and Thomas Jefferson subscribed to the theory
that government ought to promote and protect the market rather than intrude “into the conflicts
that were a natural feature of the opportunities it had to offer”); McConnell, supra note 127, at
180 (arguing that the “Privileges or Immunities Clause was unobjectionable because it referred
to a fixed set of rights defined by some combination of the Bill of Rights and longstanding
practice (usually common law”)).
142

Id.

143

Id at 181 (arguing that Congress could not establish, for example, ordinary tort or
contract laws under the guise of equal protection).
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Additionally, the original understanding of Section Five was animated by the
concern that the Supreme Court would undermine Reconstruction by narrowly
interpreting congressional power.144 Republicans, who drafted and adopted the
Fourteenth Amendment, were not enthralled with the Supreme Court, which ten
years prior to the ratification of the Amendment pronounced its decision in Dred
Scott v. Sandford.145 John Bingham “goaded his fellow members of Congress to vote
for the proposal by reminding them of the ‘horrid blasphemy’ of Dred Scott.”146
Republican Senator Oliver Morton explained that “the remedy for the violation of
the Fourteenth and Fifteenth amendments was expressly not left to the courts. The
remedy was legislative, because in each the amendment itself provided that it shall
be enforced by legislation on part of Congress.”147 Therefore, Section Five of the
Fourteenth Amendment intended that Congress is obliged and authorized to interpret
the preexisting constitutional rights.148
D. A Few Methodological Points
Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment establishes a constitutional
mechanism for Congress to interpret civil rights protected by the Privileges or
Immunities Clause149 and enact “appropriate legislation”150 or legislative remedies to
prevent abridgments of civil rights.151 In providing a legislative remedy, Congress
necessarily evaluates and reacts to social context, e.g., economic realities and social
attitudes. To argue to the contrary is to subscribe to the absurd view that Congress
provides legislative remedies to constitutional violations arbitrarily, in a vacuum and
without reference to the Constitution or to realities of American life. As the
mechanism by which Congress evaluates and recognizes economic realities and
social attitudes and treats these realities and attitudes, i.e., Section Five, is of a
constitutionally interpretive nature, recognized and treated realities and attitudes are
constitutionally significant insofar as they modify or extend prior social context
affecting interpretation of civil rights.152
144

Id. at 182.

145

60 U.S. 393 (1856).

146

McConnell, supra note 127, at 182 (citing Cong. Globe, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 483
(1868)).
147

Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 525 (1872).

148
McConnell, supra note 127, at 183. See also The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11-12
(holding that legislation enacted pursuant to Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment “must
necessarily be predicated upon supposed state laws or state proceedings, and be directed to the
correction of their operation and effect”).
149

McConnell, supra note 127, at 176.

150

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.

151

McConnell, supra note 127, at 183.

152

Congress’ recognition and treatment of these realities and attitudes as well as the
realities and attitudes themselves, once recognized, have, in Dworkin’s sense, “gravitational
force” upon the pre-existing social context accompanying the privileges or immunities, and
thus, indirectly, the interpretation of the privileges or immunities. See RONALD DWORKIN,
TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 111 (1978).
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Section Five is thus a specific originalist mechanism for translation in that it
permits Congress to account for foreground and background changes in American
life, a principal tenet of translation theory.153 Essentially, this article is an attempt to
account for such changes and Congress’ treatment and understanding of these
changes through an examination of legislation enacted pursuant to Section Five.154
In a sense, this method of translation is a variation of Professor Lessig’s concept of
synthesis as a mechanism of translation,155 the only difference being that Section
Five legislation imposes the gravitational force rather than constitutional
amendment.
VIII. THE SOCIAL CONTEXT OF MULLER AND THE “NEW” SOCIAL CONTEXT: SECTION
FIVE LEGISLATION AND THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ABORTION RESTRICTIONS
The enactments of the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) and Pregnancy
Discrimination Act (PDA) constitute an extended social context from the social
context in Muller and Adkins. This extension is emblematic of a revolutionary
change in women’s role in the labor force and a new congressional understanding of
the economic consequences on women’s reproductive role.
A. The Pregnancy Discrimination Act
Congress, in providing in the PDA that “because of sex” or “on the basis of sex”
includes “because of or on the basis of pregnancy,”156 concurred with the Muller
Court’s premise that women’s primary physiological difference is the performance
of maternal functions.157 Congress thus determined that the notion of pregnancy is
subsumed into the notion of sex.158 Moreover, as the Education and Labor
Committee noted, the PDA “unmistakably reaffirms that sex discrimination includes
discrimination based on pregnancy.”159
The PDA is also evidence of Congress’ evincement of an understanding that
pregnancy adversely affects the economic lives of women. The House Report
accompanying the PDA and compiled by the Education and Labor Committee,
explained that “the assumption that women will become pregnant and leave the labor
force leads to the view of women as marginal workers, and is at the root of the

153
See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings: Fidelity and Theory, 47
STAN. L. REV. 395 (1995).
154
In this article, these changes and the Congressional understanding accompanying them
will be termed “social context.”
155

Lessig, supra note 153, at 407 (arguing that “often the effect of an amendment is
indirect, felt beyond the text it modifies, imposing . . . a ‘gravitational force’ on other parts of
the text read. This is the effect tracked by the changed reading I call synthesis”).
156

Pub. L. 95-5, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k).

157

Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 421 (1908).

158

H.R Rep. 95-948, 95th Cong. (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4749, 4750
(stating that “it is the capacity to become pregnant which primarily differentiates the female
from the male.”)
159

H.R. REP. No. 95-948, 95th Cong. (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4744, 4751.
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discriminatory practices which keep women in low-paying and deadend jobs.”160
This understanding is emblematic of a continuity with the social context in Muller
that women’s reproductive role places women “at a disadvantage in the struggle for
subsistence,” especially when the “burdens of motherhood are upon her.”161
The PDA, as Section Five legislation and thus interpretive for Fourteenth
Amendment purposes, subsumed the notion of pregnancy into the notion of a
woman. Thus, Congress, in enacting the PDA, nullified the distinction in Geduldig
v. Aiello162 between pregnant and nonpregnant women.163
B. The Family And Medical Leave Act
The principal congressional recognition in the FMLA is that “due to the nature of
the roles of men and women in our society, the primary responsibility of family
caretaking often falls on women, and such responsibility affects the working lives of
women more than it affects the working lives of men.”164 In addition, Congress
recognized the recent, but revolutionary trend that the number of single-parent
households and two-parent households in which the single parent or both parents
work is increasing significantly.165
160

H.R. REP. No. 95-948, 95th Cong. (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4744, 4751.

161

Muller, 208 U.S. at 421.

162

417 U.S. 484 (1974) (ruling that the State of California’s exclusion of pregnancy
benefits from its insurance program did not violate the Equal Protection Clause). In the
following section, the proof construct of Geduldig will be addressed extensively.
163

Geduldig, 417 U.S. 484, 496 n.20 (basing this distinction on the contention that
nonpregnant persons include members of both sexes, while pregnant persons are exclusively
women). See Michael W. McConnell, The Selective Funding Problem: Abortions and
Religious Schools, 104 HARV. L. REV. 989, 1042 n.205 (1991) (asserting that Congress
reversed Geduldig by enacting the PDA).
164

29 U.S.C. § 2601(a)(5). See also S. REP. No. 103-3, 103d Cong. (1993), reprinted in
1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 10, stating that
Many new parents have no guarantee that their jobs will be protected either when they
are unable to work due to pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions, or after
childbirth or placement for adoption . . . when they need to stay home to care for their
infants . . . . A television anchor from Portland, OR told the subcommittee of being
forced to choose between her job and her newborn child. Ms. Rebecca Webb initially
had an agreement with her employer for a 3-month leave after childbirth. However, 7
months into her pregnancy, the leave previously granted was rescinded. The company
claimed that they did not want to set a precedent for maternity leave because there
were four other pregnant women working at the time. With the maternity leave no
longer available, Ms. Webb was forced to quit her job.
165
29 U.S.C. § 2601(a)(1) (1993). See also S. REP. No. 103-3 (1993), reprinted in 1993
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 10, stating that

The General Accounting Office reports that, over the past 40 years, the female civilian
labor force has increased by about a million workers each year. By 1990, nearly 57
million women were working or looking for work-more than a 200 percent increase
since 1950 . . . Today, according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics . . . [t]he
participation of women in the workforce was 19 percent in 1900; today 74 percent of
women aged 25-54 are in the labor force . . . The Census Bureau reports that single
parents accounted for 27 percent of all family groups with children under 18 years old
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Thus, the Labor and Human Resources Committee found in its Senate Report that
‘“mothers’ employment is often critical in keeping their families above the poverty
line.”166 A continuity therefore exists between the Muller Court’s statement about
women’s “struggle for subsistence” and Congress’ understanding that women’s
reproductive role is economically disadvantageous.167 The only change is that the
disadvantage is much greater today in light of women’s increasingly critical
economic role.
IX. THE TRANSLATION IS STRICTLY OF SOCIAL CONTEXT
The legal framework guiding the jurisprudence of the liberty to contract and the
liberty to engage in any of the common occupations is not modified or translated
despite the changed social context. Thus when women and men are “under like
circumstances,”168 the state may still not abridge women’s liberty to contract when
the same restriction could not be constitutionally extended to men.169 When women
and men are not under like circumstances, legislation exclusive to women may still
be sustained in order “to secure a real equality of right.”170 Thus, while the legal
frameworks of Muller and Adkins remain intact, the PDA and the FMLA expand the
realm of the economic analysis of women’s reproductive role.
X. ABORTION RESTRICTIONS VIOLATE THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
Under either the Adkins framework or the Muller framework, and as a
consequence of the extended social understanding, abortion restrictions are unlawful
class legislation, violative of the liberty to contract. And for similar reasons,
abortion restrictions violate the right to follow any of the common occupations.171
A. The Muller Framework
The Muller Court determined that when women are economically burdened by
their reproductive role, women are not capable of fully asserting their liberty to
in 1988, more than twice the 1970 proportion. Divorce, separation, and out-ofwedlock births have left millions of women to struggle as single heads of households
to support themselves and their children. These women often cannot keep their
families above poverty line. In 1987, 20 percent of all children under age 6 lived with
single mothers. The poverty rate among these young children was 61.4 percent, more
than five times the poverty rate of 11.6 percent among children living in two-parent
families.
166

See S. REP. No. 103-3 (1993), 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 8.

167

In addition, the FMLA may be treated as analogous to the Oregon maximum hours law
for women at issue in Muller. Both statutes are remedial and maximum hours laws, which
serve to protect women’s reproductive capacity and economic well-being.
168

Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 31 (1884).

169

See Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923).

170

Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 422 (1908). To reiterate, this form of legislation,
typified by its protective effect, allows women to be treated equally, despite not being under
like circumstances.
171

See, e.g., Butchers’ Union v. Crescent City, 111 U.S. 746, 762 (Bradley, J., concurring)
(describing this right).
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contract, and thus are not under like circumstances with men.172 The Court held that
despite women’s formal equality under the Fourteenth Amendment,173 “[s]he will
still be where some legislation to protect her seems necessary to secure a real
equality of right” and hence protective legislation for women may be sustained, even
when identical legislation for men would be unnecessary and unsustainable.174
As a matter of social context, Congress recognized in enacting the FMLA that
women’s maternal role constitutes an economic burden, and that this burden is a
result of the societal roles of men and women.175 In addition, Congress recognized in
its enactment of the PDA that the concept of a woman incorporates the concept of
pregnancy, because women’s reproductive capacity is the primary difference
between men and women.176 Accordingly, the notion of an abortion may not be
conceptually separated or removed from the notion of a pregnancy.177 In addition, as
abortion affects only women, just as pregnancy affects only women, abortion cannot
be removed from the notion of a woman that appears in the PDA. Therefore, the
constitutional notion of a woman, as appearing in Muller and the PDA, incorporates
the notion of abortion.
Abortion restrictions have adverse economic consequences on women. Reva
Siegel argues that “state action compelling motherhood injures women in predictable
ways.”178 She asserts that
Both the work of childbearing and the work of childrearing compromise
women’s opportunities in education and employment; neither the work of
childbearing nor the work of childrearing produces any material
compensation for women; most often the work of childbearing and the
work of childrearing entangle women in relations of emotional and
economic dependency—to men, extended family, or the state.179
172

Muller, 208 U.S. at 422.

173

Id. at 418.

174

Id. at 422.

175
See 29 U.S.C. § 2601(a)(5) (1993) (stating that “due to the nature of the roles of men
and women in our society, the primary responsibility for family caretaking often falls on
women, and such responsibility affects the working lives of women more than it affects the
working lives of men.”) See also Muller, 208 U.S. at 421 (recognizing that “women’s
physical structure and the performance of maternal functions place her at a disadvantage in the
struggle for subsistence is obvious. This is especially true when the burdens of motherhood are
upon her.”)
176

42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (treating sex discrimination as inclusive of pregnancy
discrimination); H.R. REP. 95-948 (“it is the capacity to become pregnant which primarily
differentiates the female from the male.”). See also Muller, 208 U.S. at 420-22 (holding that
women and men are not under like circumstances, because of the performance of maternal
functions).
177
See, e.g., WEBSTER’S COLLEGE DICTIONARY 4 (1998) defining “abortion” as: “(1) the
removal of an embryo or fetus in order to end a pregnancy, (2) any of various procedures for
terminating a pregnancy.”
178

Siegel, supra note 6, at 377.

179

Id. at 377-78.
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Catharine MacKinnon observes, identically to the social context established in the
FMLA, that “[a]fter childbirth, women tend to be the ones who are primarily
responsible for the intimate care of offspring—their own and those of others.”180 She
additionally argues that when “there is not enough money for another child or for an
abortion, it is a woman who is forced to have a child she cannot responsibly care for.
When a single parent is impoverished as a result of childbearing, usually that parent
is female. When someone must care for the children, it is almost always a woman
who does it, without her work being viewed in terms of money.”181
Congress essentially rehearsed the observations of MacKinnon and Siegel in its
enactment of the FMLA,182 and the conclusion of MacKinnon and Siegel is no
different than the Labor and Human Resources Committee’s statement that
‘“mothers’ employment is often critical in keeping their families above the poverty
line.”183 Moreover, Congress, as a matter of social context, implicitly recognized the
urgency of MacKinnon’s observations by finding that “the number of single-parent
households and two-parent households in which the single parent or both parents
work is increasing significantly.”184
Abortion restrictions have adverse economic consequences that exacerbate the
preexisting economic disparity between women and men. In addition, Congress,
consistent with Muller, in enacting the FMLA and PDA, has treated women’s
reproductive role from an economic perspective as a matter of social context.185
Thus, abortion restrictions may be examined from an economic perspective and
treated as labor legislation. However, Muller requires labor legislation for women to
be remedial in order to “secure a real equality of right.”186 As abortion restrictions
are economically punitive, and not remedial, they abridge the liberty to contract and
are unlawful class legislation in violation of the Privileges or Immunities Clause.187
B. The Adkins-Yick Wo Framework
The Supreme Court, consistent with a textualist interpretation of Section One of
the Fourteenth Amendment, held that women’s liberty to contract is formally equal

180

MacKinnon, supra note 6, at 1312.

181

MacKinnon, supra note 6, at 1313.

182

See 29 U.S.C. § 2601(a)(1)-(2), (5) (1993).

183

S. REP. 103-3, 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 8.

184

29 U.S.C. § 2601(a)(1). See also S. REP. 103-3, 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 8 (finding as of
1993, the date of Congress’ enactment of the FMLA, that 74 percent of women between the
ages of 25 and 54 were in the labor force, as compared with 19 percent in 1900, and that by
1995, two-thirds of women with pre-school children and three-quarters of the women with
school-age children will be in the labor force.).
185
The FMLA and PDA were routed through the Labor Committees of the House and
Senate.
186

Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 422 (1908).

187

Cf. Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 40 (1915) (holding that “[t]he purpose of an act must
be found in its natural operation and effect”).
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to men’s liberty to contract, and women’s “rights in these respects can no more be
infringed than the equal rights of their brothers.”188
In addition, Yick Wo proscribes “the play and action of purely personal and
arbitrary power.”189 Hence, Yick Wo permits a broader interpretation of Adkins to
encompass the proposition that women may not be subjected to restrictions upon
their liberty to contract, which are justified on the basis of a physiological
distinction, although in actuality labor legislation, and cannot physiologically be
imposed on men under similar circumstances, when physiology is not a valid basis
for distinction.190 Such restrictions are arbitrarily imposed as was the disparate
administration of the ordinance in Yick Wo.191 If women and men are assumed to be
under like circumstances,192 and abortion restrictions are considered labor legislation,
as consistent with an originalist conception of Section Five of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the economically arbitrary nature of abortion restrictions and the
manner in which they economically injure women permit a conclusion that abortion
restrictions are unlawful class legislation in violation of the Equal Protection Clause,
as interpreted by Adkins and Yick Wo.
C. Abortion Restrictions Violate the Right to Follow Any of the Common
Occupations
Yick Wo devised a framework for determining whether a certain state action
violates the right to follow any of the common occupations: if the state has acted
arbitrarily in denying some persons the right “to carry on, in the accustomed manner,
their harmless and useful occupation, on which they depend for a livelihood,” but not
other persons under like circumstances, the state action violates the Fourteenth
Amendment.193 Identical to the argument that abortion restrictions violate Adkins if
women and men are under like circumstances, abortion restrictions, which are
economic legislation and punitive to women only, are an arbitrary exercise of
188

Muller, 208 U.S. at 418; Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, 261 U.S. 525, 554 (1923)
(holding that women “are legally as capable of contracting for themselves as men.”). See also
id. at 553 (accordingly rejecting the contention that women “may be subjected to restrictions
upon their liberty to contract which could not lawfully be imposed in the case of men under
similar circumstances”).
189

Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886).

190

See also Truax, 239 U.S. at 40 (stating that “[t]he purpose of an act must be found in its
natural operation and effect”).
191
See also Barbier, 113 U.S. at 31 (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment “undoubtedly
intended . . . that no greater burdens should be laid upon one than are laid upon others in the
same calling or condition”).
192
This assumption may be justified as a matter of social context as established by the
FMLA, but originating in Adkins and the ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment. This
social context is the congressional recognition of the revolutionary rise of the number of
women in the labor force, and their economic requirements as compounded by the economic
burdens of the maternal role, often and increasingly in single-parent households. Hence,
women may be seen as having the same economic needs as men, for example, as the primary
providers for their families such that from an economic perspective, women and men are
under like circumstances.
193

See Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 373-74.
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legislative power. They moreover inhibit women’s ability to participate in the labor
force, such participation being increasingly critical to their livelihood. Abortion
restrictions, therefore, violate the right to follow any of the common occupations.
1. The Fourteenth Amendment and the Disparate Impact Proof Construct
The disparate impact proof construct presented in the preceding section, a proof
construct that is ultimately rooted in the Maltzian notion of “limited absolute
equality,”194 and reflected in Lochnerian jurisprudence, obviates the requirement of a
demonstration of purposeful discrimination, the trademark of the modern equal
protection doctrine and embodied in Geduldig and Personnel Administrator v.
Feeney.195
The Lochnerian Fourteenth Amendment proscribed state action
redistributing wealth, i.e., class legislation.196 Therefore, the Court, in determining
whether a given state action constituted economic discrimination against some and in
favor of others, used the obvious and sensible proof construct of an economic
disparate impact. In light of the Lochnerian Supreme Court’s focus on economics
and anti-redistributivism, it never considered the requirement of purposeful
discrimination that is currently required by the Equal Protection Clause. Purposeful
discrimination might govern claims of caste legislation, a second theory of
impermissible classification also rooted in the original understanding of the
Fourteenth Amendment.197 But for claims of redistributive class legislation, the
economic impact standard would seem to apply whether brought, as in this thought
experiment, under the Privileges or Immunities Clause or under the modern Equal
Protection Clause.
2. Originalism and the Continued Constitutionality of the New Deal
The Supreme Court’s decisions in Home Building & Loan Association v.
Blaisdell198 and West Coast Hotel Company v. Parrish199 signified the end of the
Lochner regime and the demise of class legislation theory. The “familiar story,” as
recounted by Professor Rosen, is that “the economic reality of the Depression had
dislodged the nineteenth-century assumptions about the equal bargaining power of
labor and capital in the common occupations of life.”200
194

See Maltz, supra note 19, at 224.

195

442 U.S. 256 (1979).

196

See, e.g., Barbier, 113 U.S. at 32.

197
See Rosen, supra note 10, at 1266. Charles Sumner defined “caste” as “the principle of
separation on the ground of hereditary inferiority.” See Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 383
(1872) (statement of Rep. Sumner).
198

290 U.S. 398 (1934).

199

300 U.S. 379 (1937) (sustaining a Washington minimum wages statute for women and
distinguishing Adkins).
200
Jeffrey Rosen, Class Legislation, Public Choice, and the Structural Constitution, 21
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 181, 189 (1997) (arguing that in Blaisdell, “the progressives . . .
were able to present a barrage of economic facts to argue that a Minnesota debtor relief statute
was not a form of class legislation benefiting debtors and burdening creditors, but was instead,
as the Court held, a ‘reasonable means to safeguard the economic structure upon which the
good of all depends.’” See also Lawrence Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings: Fidelity
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XI. ACCOUNTING FOR THE DEMISE OF LOCHNERISM AND THE NEW DEAL
The Fourteenth Amendment, in its original context, was designed to secure
“limited absolute equality” for civil rights,201 i.e., that “all men, whatever their
condition or attributes, were entitled to a certain minimum level of rights.”202 This
textual context is embodied by Lochner and its vision of radically limited
government power animated by classical economics.203 A translation, especially of
economic rights, must account for the collapse of classical economic theory in light
of marginalist and progressive critiques after the turn of the century,204 and
subsequent rise of progressive economics.205
The argument that abortion restrictions are unlawful class legislation does not
require a selection of an underlying premise of classical economics or of progressive
economics, the precise constitutional violation is of the Maltzian notion of “limited
absolute equality.” Specifically, an invalidation of abortion restrictions is simply an
abolishment of a state’s conferral of an arbitrary economic disadvantage on women
and is thus required by either economic approach. An examination of abortion
restrictions in light of the West Coast Hotel Court’s overturning of Adkins will
clarify this claim.
The West Coast Hotel Court rehearsed its earlier recognition in Muller that “the
performance of maternal functions place her at a disadvantage in the struggle for
subsistence.”206 The Court also reaffirmed the Muller Court’s determination that
men and women are not under like circumstances and authorization of constitutional
protective legislation for women.207
and Theory, 47 STAN. L. REV. 395, 457-58 (1995) (discussing the demise of the wage fund
theory).
201
Rosen, supra note 10, at 1242 (citing Earl Maltz, Reconstruction Without Revolution:
Republican Civil Rights Theory in the Era of the Fourteenth Amendment, 24 HOUS. L. REV.
221, 224 (1987)). See also Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The
Evolving Forms of Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111 (1997); Michael
McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV. 947 (1995)
(agreeing with Earl Maltz).
202
Maltz, supra note 19, at 224. As seen supra, a textual basis exists for extending
“limited absolute equality” to women.
203

Rosen, supra note 10, at 1248.

204

Rosen, supra note 10, at 1248. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. at 45, 75 (1905)
(Holmes, J., dissenting) (arguing that Lochner was “decided upon an economic theory which a
large part of the country does not entertain).
205
See Rosen, supra note 10, at 1248-49 (but defining the problem of Lochnerism more
narrowly, as a judicial failure to defer in the face of contestability).
206

West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 394 (1937) (citing Muller, 208 U.S. at

421).
207

See West Coast Hotel, 300 U.S. at 395 (and holding that there is that in her disposition
and habits of life which will operate against a full assertion of those [contractual] rights. She
will still be where some legislation to protect her seems necessary to secure a real equality of
right.’ Hence she was ‘properly placed in a class by herself, and legislation designed for her
protection may be sustained, even when like legislation is not necessary for men, and could
not be sustained.’).
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The West Coast Hotel Court also considered the Depression and its effects on the
health and well-being of exploited laborers.208 This consideration, dethroning
Lochner in its approval of economically remedial action, casts additional doubt on
the constitutionality of abortion restrictions, because this subscription to progressive
economic theory a fortiori forbids state action, like abortion restrictions, that
exacerbates the exploitation of women, who are not only exploited workers
subsisting in the Depression, but who also face the additional economic burden of
the reproductive role and still require some protective legislation to secure a real
equality of right.209
Thus, a right to be free from abortion restrictions is not grounded in any
particular economics, but rather in “limited absolute equality.”210 The variation is
that Congress may interpret the notion of “limited absolute equality” pursuant to its
interpretive powers under Section Five. Abortion restrictions may be seen as invalid
class legislation insofar as they arbitrarily relegate women to a lower economic
status. Therefore, if the argument is reliant upon the Maltzian notion, then it is
necessarily consistent with the progressive economics of the New Deal.
XII. MULLER, HOLDEN AND THE “NEW” DEAL
A. West Coast Hotel
West Coast Hotel does not nullify the liberty to contract; nor does the suggested
“resurrection” of the liberty to contract overturn the post-New Deal administrative
state. Rather, West Coast Hotel assailed the liberty to contract’s importance. It
expanded the realm of Muller so as to increase the importance and usage of the
police powers in response to the economic reality of the Depression. West Coast
Hotel accordingly consigned the liberty to contract to a dominion where its
jurisdiction is limited to an enforcement of the requirements of “limited absolute
equality,” as interpreted by Congress pursuant to Section Five.211 In addition, West
Coast Hotel recognized that the exploitation and plight of laborers during the
Depression was akin to the exploitation and plight of the Holden miners such that the
Holden exception swallowed the Lochner rule.
The Court in West Coast Hotel revisited Adkins and the constitutionality of a
minimum wages statute for women.212 The Court rehearsed the premise in Muller
that women were economically burdened by their reproductive role and determined
that women and men were not under like circumstances such that “some legislation
208

See id. at 399 (holding that there is an additional and compelling consideration which
recent economic experience has brought into a strong light. The exploitation of a class of
workers who are in an unequal position with respect to bargaining power and are thus
relatively defenseless against the denial of a living wage is not only detrimental to their health
and well being, but casts a direct burden for their support upon the community.)
209

Id. at 395; Muller, 208 U.S. at 422.

210

Insofar as classical economics is wedded to the Maltzian notion, the right to be free
from abortion restriction premises classical economics.
211

One of these requirements, if not the only one is a prohibition of foundational,
economically punitive legislation such as abortion restrictions.
212

West Coast Hotel, 300 U.S. at 386.
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to protect her seems necessary to secure a real equality of right.”213 The West Coast
Hotel Court, abandoning Adkins, characterized the wages law as like “hundreds of
so-called police laws that have been upheld”214 and ruled that no distinction between
a maximum hours law and a minimum wages law exists.215 This permitted
invocation of the police powers did not constitute a negation of the liberty to
contract; it merely granted states more power to act in order to secure a real equality
of right for women.
The West Coast Hotel Court’s sustainment of the wages law was predicated on
the Great Depression and the exploited workers left defenseless against the denial of
a living wage, and thus imperiled their health and well-being.216 This predicate,
justifying state intervention, is precisely analogous to Holden, where the Court held
that the state may act where “public health demands that one party to a contract be
protected against himself.”217 In both West Coast Hotel and Holden, the Court
emphasized that the plight of exploited workers, whose health was compromised,
implicated the interest of the state.218 West Coast Hotel then, adjudicated in the
midst of the Great Depression, only confirms the increasing significance and
prescience of Felix Frankfurter’s view in 1917 that what appeared to the Holden
Court as
a specific, and apparently, exceptional instance-the poisoning of the
human system through long hours of labor in mines, and the implications
of this evil to the general welfare-is now disclosed to be of far wider and
deeper application. It is now demonstrable that the considerations that
were patent to miners in 1898 are to-day operative . . . throughout the
industrial system.219
West Coast Hotel and the New Deal then do not represent a nullification of the
liberty to contract, but only its increasing irrelevancy in the Depression, an
irrelevancy borne by the Depression where economic despondency and imperiled
health touched the multitudes, not simply miners in Utah. As conditions for workers
increasingly deteriorated, the opportunity for state intervention increased, and the
213

Id. at 394-95 (citing Muller, 208 U.S. at 421-22).

214

Id. at 397 (citing Adkins, 261 U.S. at 570 (Holmes, J., dissenting)).

215

See West Coast Hotel, 300 U.S. at 398 (rhetorically asking that “if the protection of
women is a legitimate end of the exercise of state power, how can it be said that the
requirement of the payment of a minimum wage fairly fixed in order to meet the very
necessities of existence is not an admissible means to that end”).
216

Id. at 399.

217

Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 397 (1898). See West Coast Hotel, 300 U.S. at 394
(rehearsing Holden).
218

See West Coast Hotel, 300 U.S. at 399-400; Holden, 169 U.S. at 396-97.

219

Felix Frankfurter, et al. for defendant in error, reproduced in Bunting v. Oregon, 243
U.S. 426, 431-33 (1917). See also Lawrence Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings:
Fidelity And Theory, 47 STAN. L. REV. 395, 460 (1995) (arguing that “the Court points to the
facts learned during the recent Depression, to facts the court can take ‘judicial notice’ of, to
facts that reveal the public interest affected by this legislation, which under traditional police
power notions preserves the state power to regulate”).

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol47/iss2/4

28

1999]

ABORTION RIGHT

189

reign of the contract right’s importance ended. But as its existence in 1898 was
unchallenged, its existence in 1937 and beyond must too remain unchallenged.
B. The FMLA: Extending Muller to Men
Congress, in enacting the FMLA and consistent with its interpretive powers
pursuant to Section Five, not only affirmed Muller, but applied its social logic to
men. Congress found that “employment standards that apply to one gender only
have serious potential for encouraging employers to discriminate against employees
and applicants for employment who are of that gender.”220 In doing so, Congress did
not proscribe such standards and recognized the continued constitutional validity of
Muller.
With Muller as a foundation, Congress, in its enactment of the FMLA,
understood that men are also economically burdened by women’s reproductive role
and accordingly placed men under the umbrella of Muller.221 Specifically, Congress
found that “the lack of employment policies to accommodate working parents can
force individuals to choose between job security and parenting.”222 Congress
accordingly entitled men qua employees “to take reasonable leave . . . for the birth or
adoption of a child, and for the care of a child . . . who has a serious health
condition.”223
CONCLUSION
The Fourteenth Amendment was originally intended to forbid the states from
playing a role in the economy, i.e., from enacting economic effects unless the
intervention was consistent with the police powers. This principle was the hallmark
of Lochner. Separately, Congress has developed a greater understanding of women’s
economic role and has recognized that a woman’s maternal role constitutes a
substantial economic burden. Abortion restrictions too constitute an economic
burden, and Congress is permitted to alleviate this burden through Section Five
legislation; similarly, the Court could invalidate abortion restrictions on this ground.
After viability, fetal rights do appear to compete with women’s constitutional
economic rights. As there is no obvious or coherent constitutional notion of when
life begins, the claim in this article must be limited to Casey’s confinement of a
women’s right to choose to the pre-viability stage of pregnancy.
EPILOGUE: SAENZ V. ROE224
The Supreme Court recently invalidated a California welfare statute that limited
maximum welfare benefits available to newly arrived residents.225 The Court held
220

29 U.S.C. § 2601(a)(6) (1994).

221

See Muller, 208 U.S. at 422 (holding that “[s]he will still be where some legislation to
protect her seems necessary to secure a real equality of right.”)
222

29 U.S.C. § 2601(a)(3) (1994).

223

29 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(2) (1998).

224

119 S. Ct. 1518 (1999).

225

See Saenz v. Roe, 119 S.Ct. 1518 (1999). The California statutory scheme linked the
amount payable to a family residing in California for less than 12 months to the amount
payable by the State of the family’s prior residence. Id. at 1521.
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that the statute violated the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, a holding that, as Justice Rehnquist noted in dissent, “breathes new life
into the previously dormant Privileges or Immunities Clause . . . a Clause relied upon
by this court in only one other decision . . . . ”226 Thus, Saenz represents at least the
potential for a major turning point in Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence.
The attractiveness of the Privileges or Immunities Clause is that it restores the
historical foundation of the Fourteenth Amendment, and demands an analytical rigor
that the Equal Protection Clause and Due Process Clause do not, such that a greater
sense of definiteness can be obtained.227 However, when the Court adjudicates on
the basis of the Privileges or Immunities Clause and does not do so with the
appropriate rigor, the Court cannot achieve its goal of historical consistency and
clarity and thus vitiates the entire allure and objective of originalism. Saenz v. Roe
is, unfortunately, an example of adjudication without rigor.
The Court in Saenz participates in an exercise very similar to the thought
experiment undertaken in this article. The Court attempts to link a state welfare
benefit to the right to travel, a privilege or immunity of national citizenship.228
Similarly, we attempt to link the modern abortion right to two privileges or
immunities of national citizenship, the liberty to contract and the liberty to engage in
the common occupations.229
However, while we use Section Five legislation to treat abortion restrictions as
economic legislation, the Saenz majority merely states that a United States citizen
may become a citizen of any state, with the same rights of the citizens of that state,
and that “the right to travel embraces the citizen’s right to be treated equally in her
new state of residence . . . .”230 The Court’s notion of “right to be treated equally” is
ill-defined, and as it subsumes a state welfare benefit into the category of protected
privileges or immunities under the auspices of the right to travel, the Court’s notion
of “equally” is painted at an abstraction from the notion of limited absolute equality
animating the Fourteenth Amendment.231 Similarly, Justice Thomas, also dissenting,
correctly states that “at the time the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted, people
understood that ‘privileges or immunities of citizens’ were fundamental rights, rather
than every public benefit established by positive law.”232 But to protect a welfare
benefit as a privilege or immunity, a link must be supplied through some
constitutionally proper source or rigorous translation. In Saenz, the Court failed to
provide such a link or translation.
226

Id. at 1530 (Rehnquist, J. dissenting) (citing Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 404 (1935)
and Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83 (1940) (overrruling Colgate).
227

See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).

228

See Saenz, 119 S. Ct. at 1526 (asserting that the California law implicates the “third
aspect of the right to travel - the right of the newly arrived citizen to the same privileges and
immunities enjoyed by other citizens of the same state”).
229

One difference worth noting is that the right to travel, at least some form of it, is
mentioned in both the majority and dissenting opinions of the Slaughter-House Cases, while
this article assumes that the majority opinion is wrong.
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See Saenz, 119 S. Ct. at 1526, 1527.
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See Rosen, supra note 10, at 1242.
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See Saenz, 119 S. Ct. at 1538 (Thomas, J., dissenting).

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol47/iss2/4

30

1999]

ABORTION RIGHT

191

Thus for the California welfare law to violate the Privileges or Immunities
Clause, it must be linked in the constitutional sense to the right to travel.233
Specifically, the right to travel must function as an umbrella right, where a
constitutional right to welfare can exist. A link can arise through the enactment of
Section Five legislation, facially interpretive of the privileges or immunities or of
constitutionally significant social context. The other side of this coin is that the
Supreme Court too has a role in interpreting social context, although a role
accompanied by murky boundaries. Justice Thomas is correct to view the Saenz
decision with scepticism, because of the Court’s unpersuasive linking of a state
welfare benefit with the right to travel. In short, the majority’s concern for “the right
to be treated equally” sounds like the actual and independent ground for the welfare
law’s constitutional invalidity, though not a privilege or immunity, nor animating the
Privileges or Immunities Clause.234
The Court must, as Justice Thomas notes, ascertain the historical underpinnings
of the Privileges or Immunities Clause and place in constitutional jurisprudence.235
The Court did not do so and failed to understand or even to identify its precise role as
interpreter of the privileges or immunities. Thus, the Saenz decision must be
regarded as rash and taken without the proper cogitation needed on such a delicate
issue.236 The only connection between the welfare law and the right to travel so as to
constitutionalize the welfare law is the Court’s word, although if the Court has not
escaped the bounds of its judicial role, the Court’s word is probably sufficient.
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See also Akhil Reed Amar, Lost Clause The New Republic, June 14, 1999 at 15
(arguing that the “bigger question” for the Saenz Court was “whether maintaining somebody’s
welfare payments at a preexisting level for a year is really a ‘penalty’ on interstate
movement.”).
234
See Saenz, 119 S. Ct. at 1527. The “right to be treated equally” resembles modern
Equal Protection Doctrine in its governance of all state action, not the fundamental rightdriven Privileges or Immunities Clause.
235

Id. at 1538 (Thomas, J. dissenting).
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See also Amar, supra note 231, at 16 (wondering, with regard to the issue of general
judicial role, whether “will the Court in future cases insist on claiming all this territory for
itself, or will it prove more willing to share authority with Congress. . . [i]n these respects,
Saenz raises as many questions as it answers”).
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